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Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2005).
Priscilla Adams, J.D.
In Glass v. Goeckel ,  the Supreme Court of
Michigan was faced with this question: where, if
anywhere, can a member of the public walk on
the private beach of one of the Great Lakes with-
out trespassing on a lakefront (littoral) owner’s
property? On July 29, 2005, the court ruled that
the general public has the right to walk along the
shore of Lake Huron on land below the ordinary
high water mark. The court based its decision on
the language of the public trust doctrine and
found that walking along the lakeshore is a tradi-
tionally protected public right. 
Background
Richard and Kathleen Goeckel own property on
the shore of Lake Huron. The deed to their prop-
erty specifies one of the boundaries as the “mean-
der line of Lake Huron.” Plaintiff Joan Glass
owns property across the highway from the
Goeckels. Glass brought suit to enjoin the
Goeckels from interfering with her walking
along the shoreline. The trial court held that
Glass had a right to walk below the natural ordi-
nary high water mark as defined by the Great
Lakes Submerged Land Act (GLSLA).
The Goeckels appealed the trial court’s deci-
sion and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s order.1 The Court of Appeals stated that
although the State of Michigan holds title to pre-
Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia, 621
S.E.2d 78 (Va. 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
Opponents of a massive water supply project in
southeastern Virginia suffered a major setback in
November when the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the issuance of a building permit by the
State Water Control Board (Board).
Background
In 1993, the City of Newport News (City) filed an
application for a permit to build the King
William Reservoir. The City contends that the
Reservoir is necessary to ensure adequate future
water supply to cities in southeastern Virginia,
including Newport News, Hampton, and
Williamsburg. The Board issued the City a per-
mit in December 1997. If constructed as planned,
the Reservoir would flood more than 1,500 acres,
including 400 acres of wetlands and over 100
archaeological sites, and draw up to 75 million
gallons of water a day from the Mattaponi River.
The Mattaponi River is a popular recreational
river and provides prime spawning and nursery
habitat for important commercial freshwater fish
like striped bass and American shad. 
Virginia Supreme Court Upholds Issuance
of Permits for King William Reservoir
See Michigan, page 12
See Mid-Atlantic, page 14
Michigan Supreme Court Protects 
Public’s Right to Walk on Beach
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‘Ohana Pale Ke Ao v. Board of Agriculture, Civil
No. 051-144K (Hawaii 3rd Cir. Dec. 16, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
In October, a Hawaii trial court ruled that the
Hawaii Board of Agriculture (Board) must con-
duct a full environmental review prior to permit-
ting the importation of genetically modified
algae. Although the completion of an environ-
mental review is usually prudent, Earthjustice’s
victory appears to have had more to do with peo-
ple’s fear of genetically modified organisms
(GMO) than the actual environmental risks pre-
sented by the project.
Background
In May 2005, Mera Pharmaceuticals announced
that it was partnering with Rincon Pharma-
ceuticals to test whether microalgae can be cul-
tivated on a large scale for the production of
human protein therapies. The San Diego-based
Rincon Pharmaceuticals develops recombinant
protein therapeutics, such as monoclonal anti-
bodies, using an eukaryotic algae, Chlamy-
domonas reinhardtii, as a production system. The
technology was developed at Scripps Research
Institute and “involves introducing the gene
sequence responsible for producing a particular
human protein into the cells of the algae.”1 The
algae will then produce that protein which can
be harvested and developed into a drug. Rincon
currently produces proteins in the laboratory,
but the technology will only be useful to the
pharmaceutical industry if production can occur
on a commercial scale. 
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Pharmaceutical companies currently use
industrial fermenters to cultivate bacteria from
which they produce drugs. Unfortunately,
microalgae cannot be cultivated in fermenters
because  the  plants  need sunlight .  Mera
Pharmaceuticals believes it has solved this prob-
lem. According to the company’s website it has
developed a “closed, controlled system that
admits through its transpar-
ent walls the light that plants
need to grow.” A mixture of
algae, nutrients, and freshwa-
ter is kept in constant circula-
tion within these “photobiore-
actors”  where  computers
closely monitor pH, tempera-
ture, nutrient levels, and light.
The photobioreactors, which
must  be  located  outs ide ,
resemble small trenches cov-
ered in plastic. Mera currently
uses this system at its facili-
ties at the Natural Energy
Laboratory Hawaii (NELHA),
a land-based aquaculture
technology park in Kona,
Hawaii, to produce dietary
supplements. 
If the algae-based production system proves
successful, it could reduce the cost of producing
monoclonal antibodies to $100 to $150 per gram.
Today, a gram costs between $1,000 to $1,500 and
some drug companies charge as much as $20,000
per patient for some protein drugs.2
Regulatory Framework
Chlamydomonas reinhardtii is included on
Hawaii’s “List of Restricted Microorganisms”
and a permit is required from the Plant Quar-
antine Branch (PQB) to import and possess.
Mera applied for an importation permit and the
PQB determined that the particular GM algal
strains Mera sought to import posed an above-
moderate risk which triggered a requirement
that the Board approve the permit. Several con-
tentious public hearings were held. Opponents
seem particularly worried that the algae could
escape and become established in Hawaii or
cross with native strains of Chlamydomonas.3
Mera and Rincon insist the risks are low (the
algae will be enclosed in plastic and not open to
the environment) and can be mitigated by con-
tainment procedures. The Board eventually
granted Mera permission to import seven strains
of Chlamydomonas to start field trials at NELHA.
No written opinion was issued.
Earthjustice, on behalf of a
number  o f  c i t i zen  groups
including GMO-Free Hawaii
and the Hawaii Chapter of the
Sierra Club, filed suit soon
thereafter.
Lawsuit
Earthjustice focused on the fact
that the Board had not con-
ducted an environmental re-
view pursuant to the Hawaii
Environmental  Policy  Act
(HEPA). HEPA applies to,
among other things, actions
that “propose the use of state or
county lands.”4 HEPA requires
the preparation of an environ-
mental assessment (EA) to
determine whether an environmental impact
statement is necessary. The court held that, at a
minimum, an EA should have been prepared
because the algae is intended for use at NELHA,
a state-owned and -operated facility. Although
the record revealed that the Board undertook a
detailed assessment pursuant to its importation
procedures, the court found no case law to sup-
port the Board’s position that this supplemented
HEPA review. Two environmental impact state-
ments prepared for NELHA in 1976 and 1985
did consider the production of algae, but the
court found that the mass production of GM
algae is a “new circumstance which may consti-
tute a different environmental impact.” 
Conclusion
The court’s ruling rendered the Board’s approval
invalid. The Board will need to prepare at least
See Hawaii, page 9
Photograph courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp
Medeiros v. Vincent, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 27093
(1st Cir. Dec. 12, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
Fisheries lawsuits move through the First
Circuit like clockwork. Most recently, the court
was called on to examine the constitutionality of
a Rhode Island Department of Environmental
Management (DEM) regulation restricting the
number of lobsters harvested by methods other
than lobster traps.
Background
The fifteen Atlantic States and the District of
Columbia jointly manage the fish stocks within
state waters (three miles from shore) through
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Com-
mission (Commission). The Commission devel-
ops interstate fishery management plans (IFMP)
for the various East Coast fisheries. The Atlantic
Coastal Act authorized the Commission to
require member states to adopt and comply with
IFMP terms the Commission deems are “neces-
sary.”1 If a state refuses to comply with a neces-
sary term, the Secretary of Commerce may
impose a fishing moratorium in the offending
state’s coastal waters.
In December 1997, the Commission promul-
gated a number of “necessary” measures for the
Atlantic lobster fishery. Almost all lobsters
caught along the Atlantic coast are harvested by
lobster traps. A very small percentage are har-
vested by netting or trawling. Amendment 3
reduced the number of lobster traps a vessel
could carry and, in an attempt to allow more
juvenile lobsters to escape the traps, reduced the
trap capacity and the size of trap vents. For the
other gear sectors, Amendment 3 limited the
daily harvest to 100 lobsters, 500 for vessels at
sea for five or more days. 
The Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council
(RIMFC) issued Regulation 15.18 implement-
ing these provisions soon thereafter. Not all state
officials were supportive of Amendment 3, how-
ever, and in June 2000, the RIMFC repealed
Regulation 15.18. The Commission quickly noti-
fied the Secretary of Commerce that Rhode
Island was no longer in compliance with the nec-
essary terms of Amendment 3. Rhode Island
avoided a lobstering moratorium only by rein-
stating Regulation 15.18. 
While  a l l  this  was  going  on,  Stephen
Medeiros was indicted in June 1999 for violating
Regulation 15.18 after he landed 131 lobsters
harvested with trawl gear. Although the charges
were ultimately dismissed, Medeiros, most like-
ly due to the recission of the regulation, filed
suit in state court against the Commission and
the DEM alleging that Amendment 3 and
Regulation 15.18 are unconstitutional. The case
was removed to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Rhode Island. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the gov-
ernmental agencies. The First Circuit affirmed
the district court’s rulings.
Equal Protection
Medeiros first argued that Amendment 3 and
Regulation 15.18 violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Unless a statute
or regulation employs a suspect classification,
such as race or gender, or impairs a fundamental
right, it need only bear a rational relationship to
a legitimate government purpose. Medeiros con-
ceded that non-trap lobstermen are not a suspect
class. He argued instead that Amendment 3 and
the state regulation infringed on his fundamen-
tal right to pursue the livelihood of his choosing.
As there is no fundamental right “to make a liv-
ing,” the court dismissed Medeiros’s argument
and subjected the provisions in question to a
rational relationship review.
The Commission and Rhode Island defend-
ed their differing treatments of trap and non-
trap lobstering based on the gear’s impacts on
Page 4 Volume 4, No. 4  The SandBar
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lobsters. To ensure adequate egg production,
regulators focus on protecting “soft shedders,”
newly molted lobsters. Soft shedders are gener-
ally not caught in lobster traps because they can
escape through the trap vents. This is
not true of trawl and net gear.
Trawl gear can cause exten-
sive shell damage if lobsters
are unfortunate enough to
be run over while on the bot-
tom and nets provide no
escape routes. Furthermore,
lobsters are not the target
species of trawlers. 
Trawlers are fishing for
finfish and the lob-




found that, in light of
these differences, it was
reasonable for the regula-
tors to enact different lim-
its for the different gear
sectors .  For  example ,
increasing the mesh size
of nets as with the vent
sizes would diminish
the ability of trawlers
to catch finfish. The
100/500 limit reason-
ably accounted for the his-
toric incidental catch. The low limit on lobster
harvesting by trawlers may also provide some
conservation benefit in the future, the court
found. The limit is “a prophylactic measure to
prevent any future redirection of efforts from
trap lobstering and finfishing into non-trap lob-
stering methods.”2 There was sufficient evidence
that Amendment 3 and Regulation 15.18 were
rationally related to the legitimate government
purpose of lobster conservation. 
Tenth Amendment
Medeiros also argued that the Atlantic Coastal
Act, specifically the moratorium provision, is an
impermissible “commandeering” of the states’
legislative prerogatives by the federal govern-
ment.3 Basically, Medeiros claims that the mere
threat of a moratorium caused Rhode Island to
adopt the provisions of Amendment 3 against its
will. The defendants coun-




ment states that “the
powers not dedicat-
ed  to  the  Uni ted
States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohib-
ited to the States, are
reserved to the States
respectively, or to the
people .”  The U.S.
Supreme Court has
ruled that private citi-
zens lack standing to
maintain Tenth Amend-
ment claims.4 The Tenth
Amendment protects states,
not individual citizens, against
power grabs by the federal gov-
ernment. Only a state, therefore,
may raise a “commandeering”
claim. 
Conclusion
The First Circuit upheld the rulings of
the District Court affirming the constitutionali-
ty of Amendment 3 and Rhode Island Regulation
15.18. The 100/500 limit remains in effect.
Endnotes
1. See 16 U.S.C. § 5101(a).
2.  Medeiros v. Vincent, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
27093 at *15 (1st Cir. Dec. 12, 2005).
3.  Id. at *19.
4.  See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939).
Baccarat Fremont Developers v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 425 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005).
Jonathan Lew, 2L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
In Baccarat, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) could regu-
late “adjacent wetlands” regardless of whether
such wetlands have a “significant hydrological or
ecological connection” to navigable waters.1
Further, the court distinguished the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC) by
finding that SWANCC merely invalidated the
migratory bird rule2 and did not address the issue
of jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands.
Background
Baccarat Fremont Developers
purchased a 30.98-acre site that
contained 7.66 acres of wet-
lands. The purchased wetlands
were adjacent to two flood con-
trol channels that are navigable
and connect to the San Fran-
cisco Bay. The flood channels
run parallel to the site’s south-
ern and western boundaries
and are separated from the wetlands by man-
made berms. 
In February 1998, the Corps determined that
it had jurisdiction over the 7.66 acres of wetlands
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) because the
wetlands were adjacent to navigable waterways.3
On January 29, 2001, Baccarat requested that the
Corps reconsider its jurisdiction in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC.4 The
Corps reaffirmed its determination of jurisdic-
tion, explaining that SWANCC “did not elimi-
nate the Corps’ authority to regulate wetlands
adjacent to a tidal waterway.”5
In February 2002, the Corps offered Baccarat
a permit to fill 2.36 acres of wetland subject to
the condition that it create 2.36 acres of seasonal
freshwater wetlands and enhance the remaining
5.3 acres of existing brackish wetlands. Baccarat
sued the Corps in California Superior Court,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Corps’ determination that it had jurisdiction over
the wetlands. Upon removal to federal District
Court, the District Court granted summary judg-
ment to the Corps, finding that the agency has
adjacency jurisdiction over the wetlands.
Supreme Court Case Law
The Supreme Court has explicitly addressed the
Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands based
on the CWA in U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). In Riverside, the
Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction
over wetlands adjacent to
waters of the U.S. The Court
concluded that all adjacent
wetlands are waters of the U.S.
even though some adjacent
wetlands may not be environ-
mentally significant to their
adjoining bodies of water. The
fact that a majority of adjacent
wetlands have an ecological
connection to waters of the U.S. is sufficient to
support broader jurisdiction over other wetlands.
The Court rejected the idea that for the Corps to
have jurisdiction it must demonstrate a signifi-
cant hydrological or ecological connection
between the wetlands and the adjacent water. 
Baccarat argued that all jurisdictional claims
by the Corps must be factually based and the
Corps cannot assert jurisdiction over all adjacent
wetlands because such a broad determination is
“arbitrary and capricious” for failure to articulate
a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.6 The Court disagreed with
Page 6 Volume 4, No. 4  The SandBar
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Baccarat’s argument because if the Corps encoun-
ters a wetland that is not significantly connected
to adjacent waterways it may issue a permit
authorizing construction. The Corps’ ecological
judgment about the relationship between waters
and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate
basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands
may be defined as waters under the CWA.
Baccarat relied on SWANCC to support its
contention that adjacent wetlands must be hydro-
logically or ecologically connected to waters of
the U.S. Reading the CWA to extend jurisdiction
to inland ponds would effectively read the term
navigable waters out of the statute.7 But SWANCC
did not address the issue of jurisdiction over adja-
cent wetlands. The holding in SWANCC only
overruled the Migratory Bird Rule because it was
not “fairly supported by the CWA.” Moreover,
Riverside seems to control the issue of adjacent
jurisdiction and there is no indication that
SWANCC intended to overrule Riverside.
Circuit Court Case Law
The Ninth Circuit also reviewed its decision in
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District, 243
F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001). In that case, the Ninth
Circuit upheld EPA’s jurisdiction over irrigation
canals, finding that they were tributaries falling
within the regulatory definition of waters of the
United States. Headwaters only addressed bodies
of waters that were connected to tributaries and
the holding certainly cannot be read to address
the question of whether a significant hydrologi-
cal or ecological connection to a particular adja-
cent wetland is required.
The Ninth Circuit joins the Sixth Circuit in
rejecting the idea that SWANCC modified the
holding of Riverside. In Carabell v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004)
the Carabells wanted to fill wetlands and the
Corps declined to issue a permit. They brought a
suit arguing that the Corps lacked jurisdiction
over the wetlands. Similar to Baccarat, the wet-
lands on the Carabells’ property are separated
from water only by manmade berms. The
Sixth Circuit held that SWANCC did not decide
any issue with regard to adjacent wetlands and
the Corps ultimately had jurisdiction over the
Carabells’ land because the wetlands were adja-
cent to navigable waters.
Conclusion
By adopting a narrow reading of SWANCC, the
Ninth Circuit joins most other circuits in essen-
tially eliminating any requirement for a “signifi-
cant nexus.” In these circuits, adjacency jurisdic-
tion does not depend on the existence of a signifi-
cant hydrological or ecological connection
between the particular wetlands at issue and the
waters of the United States. However, it is impor-
tant to note that this dispute is ongoing and the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Carabell along with
U.S. v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).8
Endnotes
1.  Baccarat Fremont Developers v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 425 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2005).
2.  In SWANCC, the Corps asserted jurisdiction
over intrastate waters used as habitat by migra-
tory birds.
3.  The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters and grants the Corps the
power to issue permits for discharges of
dredged or fill material into waters of the U.S.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
4.  In SWANCC the petitioner’s proposed waste
disposal site was a habitat for migratory birds
and the Supreme Court held that federal
agency jurisdiction under the CWA did not
extend to such non-navigable, isolated,
intrastate waters, because the CWA expressly
limits such jurisdiction to navigable waters.
5.  Baccarat, 425 F.3d at 1152.
6.  U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc, 474 U.S.
121, 134 (1985).
7.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-172.
8.  Rapanos, a Michigan developer, was convicted
of violating the Clean Water Act for filling his
wetlands with sand to make the land ready for
development. The acreage is bone dry – inten-
tionally – because the county government dug
drainage ditches around it 100 years ago so it
could be used for farming.
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Isla Nena Air Services, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
380 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.P.R. 2005). 
Aubrey Posey, 3L, Stetson University College of Law
On August 30, 2003, a single-engine Cessna
plane operated by Isla Nena Air Services (Isla
Nena) suffered engine failure during a flight
from the city of Fajardo, Puerto Rico to Culebra,
a Puerto Rican island approximately twenty
miles from Fajardo. The pilot was forced to make
an emergency landing in the waters near
Flamenco Beach on Culebra. Although all nine
passengers made it to shore safely, the aircraft
suffered extensive damage. 
Isla Nena sued Cessna Aircraft Company, the
aircraft’s manufacturer, and Pratt & Whitney, the
aircraft engine’s manufacturer, seeking damages
for loss of the aircraft, repair costs to the aircraft,
lost income during the time the aircraft was out
of service and other damages based on tort and
strict liability theories for defective products
manufacture. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico held that Isla Nena’s
claims were barred by the economic loss rule.
Admiralty Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the district court deter-
mined that admiralty law, not Puerto Rican law,
controlled. To determine admiralty jurisdiction
in land-based aircraft crashes over ocean water,
courts apply a two-part test developed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation Co.
v. City of Cleveland, Ohio. Admiralty law will con-
trol if the site of the crash was within navigable
waters and there is a nexus between the activity
involved and traditional maritime activity.1
The district court found that the first prong
of the test was met easily as Congress has specifi-
cally stated that the waters around Puerto Rico
a n d  i t s  i s l a n d s  a r e  n a v i g a b l e  w a t e r s . 2
Furthermore, even if Congress had not specifi-
cally defined Puerto Rico’s waters as naviga-
ble,“it has long been the rule that all waters with-
in the ebb and flow of the tide are considered
navigable waters.”3
The nexus prong, however, required more
analysis. Several Supreme Court cases following
Executive Jet have further defined the nexus
requirement. To have the appropriate nexus, the
incident must have a “potentially disruptive
impact on maritime commerce” and “the general
character of the incident giving rise to the inci-
dent [must] bear a significant relationship to tra-
ditional maritime activity.”4 The district court
found that the crash of an airplane flying between
Fajardo and Culebra could have a potential
impact on maritime commerce. In Executive Jet,
for instance, the Supreme Court held that a sink-
ing plane created a potential hazard for other ves-
sels in the water and therefore could have an
impact on maritime commerce. Similarly, the Isla
Nena plane created a hazard for other vessels.
The district court gave no weight to Isla Nena’s
argument that admiralty law was inapplicable
because the air travel had no actual effect on mar-
itime commerce, concluding that potential
impact was enough to exercise jurisdiction.
The district court also found that the trans-
portation services provided by Isla Nena between
the Puerto Rican mainland and islands was a tra-
ditional maritime activity. The court reached
this conclusion by focusing on the activity, trans-
portation of people from one part of Puerto Rico
to another, rather than any particular conduct of
Isla Nena or Cessna. Before aircraft, boats trans-
ported people between the mainland and the
islands. Although planes now perform this func-
tion, the transportation of people along these
routes is still a traditional maritime activity. In
addition, as it is inevitable that a plane operating
between Fajardo and Culebra would crash in
navigable waters, the flight bears a significant
relationship to maritime activities. 
Isla Nena argued that the exercise of admiral-
ty jurisdiction was improper because the compo-
Lawsuit Against Cessna Aircraft Dismissed
for Failure to Allege Non-economic Damages
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nent part responsible for the engine failure was
not manufactured exclusively for maritime use.
Isla Nena claimed, therefore, that transportation
on the aircraft could not be a traditional mar-
itime function. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the component parts of a defective
product need not be manufactured specifically
for maritime use as an injury at sea from a defec-
tive product is enough for admiralty law to apply.
Economic Loss Rule 
Cessna and Pratt & Whitney also argued that Isla
Nena’s claims were barred by the economic loss
rule. The economic loss rule, recognized in
admiralty law,5 precludes recovery for a tort
claim between two parties in a commercial rela-
tionship when the only damage resulting from an
incident is damage to the product itself. To avoid
application of the economic loss rule and suc-
cessfully bring a tort or strict liability claim, a
plaintiff must allege that a defective product
caused damage to property other than itself or
that the product caused personal injuries. If a
plaintiff fails to allege personal injury or other
property damage, the only available theory of
recovery is breach of warranty.
The district court determined that the rela-
tionship between Isla Nena and Cessna and Pratt
& Whitney was a commercial relationship (the
sale of an aircraft). Isla Nena alleged only that
the aircraft was damaged as a result of the emer-
gency landing, but it made no allegations that
the defective engine caused personal injuries or
damage to other property. As Isla Nena alleges a
defect in the aircraft or a component part caused
the damage to the aircraft, its only available rem-
edy is a breach of warranty action.
Conclusion
The district court dismissed Isla Nena’s tort and
strict liability claims against Cessna and Pratt &
Whitney under the economic loss rule because
the emergency landing caused damage only to
the plane itself.
Endnotes
1.  Executive Jet Aviation Co. v. City of Cleveland,
Ohio, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
2.  See 42 U.S.C. § 749.
3.  Isla Nena Air Services, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (D.P.R. 2005). 
4. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
5.  See East River Steamship v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
an EA before re-permitting the project. The
additional delay and cost associated with an
extensive environmental review seems unneces-
sary in this case. Mera and Rincon intend to use
an existing facility to grow algae in a closed sys-
tem. Yes, it is genetically modified, but a microal-
gae production process could result in much-
needed new drugs. Opponents of the project
voiced generalized concerns related to the use of
GM in agriculture rather than focusing on the
specific project. This case is a prime example of
the need for companies and proponents of new
technology to conduct public outreach cam-
paigns. The public is less likely to oppose pro-
jects they understand and companies they believe
have fully considered the risks.
Endnotes
1. Penni Crabtree, Algae to Antibodies, THE SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 20, 2005.
2.  Id.
3. Dayton Kevin, Modified Algae Project Halted,
THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 11, 2005.
4. HAWAII REV. STAT. §343-5(a)(1).
Hawaii, from page 3
Photograph courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 621 S.E.2d 19 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
In a closely watched public access case, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals recently upheld the
dismissal of the landowners’ claims against
Currituck County and several state resources
agencies. Because the dismissal turned on proce-
dure, the court avoided having to address the real
issue - whether the public has access to privately
owned dry sand beaches.
Until a couple of decades ago, Currituck
County near Corolla, North Carolina was an iso-
lated area of the Outer Banks. Lacking paved
roads, access was generally gained by driving a
four-wheel drive vehicle across the beach. In the
mid-1970s, development began on Whalehead
Club. Marketed as an exclusive, isolated beach
community, most buyers were from out-of-state,
many attorneys from the D.C metro area, New
Jersey, and New York. The extension of paved
roads into the area in the 1980s and ‘90s, fol-
lowed by hotels, restaurants, and shops, resulted
in a massive visitor influx. 
In  1998 ,  s evera l  p roper ty  owners  in
Whalehead, fed up with sharing what they con-
sidered their private beach, filed suit claiming a
right to prevent the public from using the beach
in front of their houses. That year state officials
estimated that on a typical Sunday 20,000 visi-
tors were coming to the Currituck beaches.1 It’s
l ike ly  tha t  a  f ew  bad  seeds  pushed  the
Whalehead residents over the edge. Newspaper
accounts repeatedly list the same complaints:
noise, trash, strangers knocking on doors to use
the bathroom, and “brazen” use of showers on
decks or under the houses.2
North Carolina is a high water state. That
means the seaward boundary of oceanfront prop-
erty generally extends to the mean high water
mark. Although the title to this land is in private
hands, it has long been the position of the state
that the area between the high water mark and
the vegetation line, known as the “dry sand
beach,” remains open to the public. The plain-
tiffs strongly disagree.3
Unfortunately the court never reached the
issue of whether the public has a right to use the
dry sand beaches for recreational purposes. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial
court that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by
the sovereign immunity doctrine, which pre-
cludes suits against a government without its
consent. The plaintiffs argued that immunity
was waived by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-10.1 which
allows actions against the state to quiet title
when the state and an individual “assert a claim
of title to the [same] land.” The court found this
provision inapplicable because none of the
defendants had asserted a “claim of title to land.”
North Carolina does not dispute that oceanfront
property owners may hold title seaward to the
high water mark. Its position is that the public
must be permitted access regardless of the deed. 
Because the court failed to reach the merits
of the case, the extent of public rights remains
unclear. The controversy is far from over, howev-
er, as the plaintiffs are likely to appeal to the
state Supreme Court. A victory for the landown-
ers could have significant ramifications, as
about half of the North Carolina shoreline is pri-
vate owned.
Endnotes
1.  Martha Quillin, Public Beach or Private Land?,
THE NEWS AND OBSERVER, Sept. 5, 1998.
2.  Id.  See also Jerry Allegood, Beachfront
Landowners Lose Public Access Case, THE NEWS
& OBSERVER, July 23, 2003. 
3.  For a detailed discussion of shoreline proper-
ty rights in North Carolina and additional
background information on the Fabrikant liti-
gation, see Joseph J. Kalo, The Changing Face of
the Shoreline: Public and Private Rights to the
Natural and Nourished Dry Sand Beaches of
North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1869 (2000).
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Whiting v. State of Alaska, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS
115 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
Whiting v. State of Alaska will definitely make my
Top Ten list of favorite cases for 2005. An Alaskan
boater recently sought to overturn his conviction
for felony driving under the influence by making
the intriguing argument that the jury should
have been instructed on the lesser offense of
attempted DUI. The Court of Appeals of Alaska
wasted no time dismissing this argument. 
Background
It all started when Michael Whiting decided to
go fishing with his girlfriend and her six-
year-old son. Whiting piloted his skiff into the
Gastineau Channel and turned the motor off.
While the skiff drifted and the three fished,
Whiting remained near the rear of the skiff by
the motor drinking alcoholic beverages. 
Things went rapidly downhill when a Coast
Guard vessel approached the skiff to see if the
little boy was wearing a life vest. The officers
soon realized that Whiting was intoxicated and
arrested him for driving under the influence
despite Whiting’s pleas that he was sober when
he piloted the boat into the Channel. Shocking!
“Attempted” DUI
Relying on public defenders to keep you out of
jail can be risky. Whiting, however, won the pub-
lic defender lottery. His attorneys vigorously
argued at trial that a reasonable juror presented
with the above facts could conclude that Whiting
was not guilty of operating a watercraft under the
influence for the simple reason that the motor
was off. That’s like arguing a motorist drinking
while stuck in a massive traffic jam is not guilty
of DUI if the motor is off. Doesn’t seem quite
right, does it? Although Whiting’s attorneys con-
ceded that he intended to start the motor when
they were done fishing, they insisted he could be
found guilty only of attempted DUI since he had
not actually driven the boat while intoxicated.
The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on
such an offense.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial judge and highlighted the fundamental
flaw in Whiting’s argument. Whiting’s defense is
based on the assumption that the statutory defin-
ition of driving under the influence does not
encompass the situation in which an intoxicated
person is in control of a watercraft whose engine
is off.1 The court disagreed, stating that operat-
ing a watercraft includes being in control of a
watercraft even when the engine is not running.
Since Whiting was in control of the skiff, he was
operating the skiff for the purposes of the Alaska
DUI statute.
As for Whiting’s attempt argument, to consti-
tute an attempt under Alaskan law, the defen-
dant’s intent to commit a crime must be accom-
panied by “conduct which constitutes a substan-
tial step toward the commission of that crime.”2
Until the defendant takes that step, there is no
punishable attempt. Whiting’s mere willingness
or intention to operate the skiff while intoxicated
later in the day is not an attempt.
Conclusion
Whiting v. State of Alaska is yet another reminder
that fact is often as entertaining as fiction. You
simply cannot make this stuff up. And let this be
a lesson to all you boaters out there. If you are
going to drink while on a fishing trip, move to
the front of the boat and sober up before piloting
the vessel home. A few extra hours spent fishing
might just keep you out of jail.
Endnotes
1.  Under ALASKA STAT. §28.35.030(a), “a person
commits the crime of driving while under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage, inhalant,
or controlled substance if the person operates
or drives a motor vehicle or operates an air-
craft or a watercraft.”
2.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(a).
Court Refuses to Recognize Lesser 
Offense of Attempted DUI
viously submerged land, it does so subject to the
riparian owner’s exclusive use up to the water’s
edge. Therefore, according to the court, lakefront
property owners have the exclusive right to use
the land up to the water’s edge. Glass appealed to
the Michigan Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan heard the
appeal in March of 2005 in order to decide
whether the public has a right to walk along the
shores of the Great Lakes, “where a private
landowner ostensibly holds title to the water’s
edge.” In reaching its decision that Glass has the
right to walk along the shore in front of the
Goeckels’ property, the court focused on the pub-
lic trust doctrine. More specifically, it looked at
how the doctrine affects a property owner’s pri-
vate title, and whether walking is an activity pro-
tected by the doctrine. 
History of the Public Trust Doctrine
American law has long recognized that the sover-
eign must preserve and protect the public’s inter-
est in the seas for navigation and fishing.
Michigan’s courts have held that the common law
of the sea applies to the Great Lakes; therefore,
the public trust doctrine inherent in the common
law of the sea applies to the Great Lakes.
The Supreme Court relied heavily on the
public trust doctrine to reach its decision that
Glass does not interfere with the Goeckels’ prop-
erty rights when she walks along the shore of
Lake Huron. According to common law, the state
has an obligation to preserve and protect the
waters of the Great Lakes, as well as the lands
beneath them. The state, in effect, acts as the
trustee. 
Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine
The Michigan Supreme Court considered
whether the public trust doctrine applies only to
land that is below the waters of the Great Lakes,
as the Goeckels argued, or if it encompasses land
up to the ordinary high water mark. Glass relied
on the GLSLA arguing that it defines the scope
of the public trust doctrine as extending to all
lands below the ordinary high water mark. The
court disagreed, stating that the GLSLA estab-
lishes the scope of the Legislature’s regulatory
authority pursuant to the public trust doctrine,
but it does not purport to establish the bound-
aries to which the public trust doctrine applies.
The court looked to common law to determine
the scope of the public trust doctrine in Michigan. 
As applied to oceans, the public trust doc-
trine encompasses an area from the water and
the land beneath them to that point on the shore
known as the “ordinary high water mark.”2 The
court noted that the term “ordinary high water
mark” has a more concrete meaning as applied to
tidal waters that have predictable high and low
tides based on lunar cycles. Nevertheless, the
term “ordinary high water mark” is applicable to
the Great Lakes because water levels change
because of precipitation and other factors. The
court recognized that the fluctuation of the water
level of the Great Lakes results in the exposure of
land where water once was and that rain or other
factors could easily render this land submerged
once again. The Court defined the “ordinary
high water mark” as follows:
The point on the bank or shore up to which
the presence and action of the water is so
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either
by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegeta-
tion, or other easily recognized characteris-
tic. And where the bank or shore at any par-
ticular place is of such a character that [it] is
impossible or difficult to ascertain where
the point of ordinary high-water mark is,
recourse may be had to other places on the
bank or shore of the same stream or lake to
determine whether a given stage of water is
above or below ordinary high-water mark.
Walking and the Public Trust Doctrine 
Having established that the public trust doctrine
applies to land below the ordinary high water
mark, the court next had to decide if walking is a
protected activity under this doctrine. Fishing,
hunting, and navigation for commerce and plea-
sure have traditionally been protected by the
public trust doctrine. It follows that in order to
engage in these activities, the public must have a
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right of passage over the ordinary high water
mark. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that
walking along the lakeshore below the ordinary
high water mark is an activity that must be safe-
guarded in order to protect these traditional pub-
lic rights.
Related Points of Interest
While the court unanimously agreed that the
Goeckels could not prevent Glass from walking
along the shore of Lake Huron, the dissent raised
some interesting points. Justice Markman, citing
Hilt v. Weber,3 stated that the public trust doc-
trine should only apply to lands which are sub-
merged under the Great Lakes and the wet
sands. Applying the majority’s vague definition
of the “ordinary high water mark” could lead to
an increase in litigation between the public and
lakefront property owners to determine the exact
location of this mark. The open beaches of the
Great Lakes could become dotted with fences
erected by property owners - a viable option
according to the dissent. 
Furthermore, while the Supreme Court ruled
that the public could walk along the shore, it did
not address what other activities are permissible
in the area below the ordinary high water mark.
Litigation may be needed to discern whether var-
ious activities such as sunbathing, riding ATVs,
building bonfires, etc. are permissible.
Conclusion
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the pub-
lic trust doctrine protects the public’s right to
walk along the beach. Not surprisingly, private
property groups are unhappy with the decision,
although the opinion is consistent with most
courts’ interpretations of the public trust doctrine.
On December 13, 2005, the Goeckels and
Save Our Shoreline filed a petition for a Writ of
Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing
the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision effected
an unconstitutional taking of private property.4 A
decision on whether to hear the Goeckels’ appeal
is not expected from the Supreme Court for sev-
eral months. The Law Center is closely monitor-
ing this case and will issue announcements as it
moves forward.
Endnotes
1. 683 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. 2004). For a detailed
analysis of the Court of Appeals’ decision, see
Stephanie Showalter, No Right to Walk Between
High Water Mark and Water ’s  Edge ,  THE
SANDBAR 3:2, 1 (July 2004).
2. Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894).
3. 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930).
4. See Traci Anderson-Weisenbach, SOS Asking
Supreme Court for Review of Michigan’s Decision
on Glass v.  Geockel ,  TH E HU R O N DA I LY
TRIBUNE, Dec. 19, 2005.
The Ocean and Coastal Conservation Guide 2005-2006 Now Available
Make room next to your phone book, a new directory is available! The Ocean and Coastal Conservation
Guide 2005 - 2006 is chock full of phone numbers, addresses, and websites for more than 2,000 orga-
nizations working to protect and manage our ocean and coastal areas. The Guide is very user-friend-
ly with listings separated into marine conservation organizations, government agencies, marine
schools and science centers, and national ocean sanctuaries and marine parks. So, whether you are
headed back to school, need to locate marine conservation organizations in your region, must track
down a government agency, or need to find your next great vacation spot, this is the book for you.
For those times you need to locate an organization in a hurry, The Guide contains two indexes to
facilitate access: an alphabetical organizational name index and a geographic index. Get your copy
now and reach out to your colleagues and help the editor build a “seaweed (marine grassroots) rebel-
lion of creativity and solutions-oriented efforts across our land and from sea to shining sea.”
The Ocean and Coastal Conservation Guide 2005-2006, David Helvarg, ed. (Island Press, July 2005,
Paper: $26.95, ISBN: 1-55963-861-3).
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Opposition to the Reservoir is strong.
Following the Board’s decision, the Mattaponi
Tribe and the Alliance to Save the Mattaponi, a
coalition of environmental groups which
includes the Sierra Club and the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, filed petitions for review with
the Circuit Court. The Mattaponi Tribe is a
small tribe whose reservation abuts the
Mattaponi River. The tribe is not currently rec-
ognized by the federal government, but it is rec-
ognized by the Commonwealth of Virginia. The
Tribe claims that the construction of the
Reservoir will impair its members’ right to hunt
and fish guaranteed by the 1677 Treaty of Middle
Plantation. The Alliance contends the project
will cause extensive environmental damage and
argues that the Board’s decision is not supported
by substantial evidence.
The Circuit Court dismissed both the
Alliance’s and the Tribe’s appeals due to lack of
standing. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
back to the Circuit Court, holding that the orga-
nizations had standing because there was a casu-
al connection between their alleged injuries and
the Board’s decision. The second time around,
the Circuit Court found that the Board’s decision
was supported by substantial evidence. In addi-
tion, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
decide the Tribe’s treaty claims. The Court of
Appeals affirmed and transferred the treaty
claims to the Supreme Court. The Alliance and
the Tribe appealed.
Sovereign Immunity
Virginia consistently argued that state law
immunized it from suit. Virginia asserted that
Virginia Code § 2.2-4002(B)(3), which exempts
from judicial review the “location, design, speci-
fications, or construction of public buildings or
other facilities,” applied to this case because the
Reservoir was a public facility. Both the Circuit
Court and the Court of Appeals found that the
state was not immune. The Supreme Court had
not addressed this issue when the case was before
it in 2001, but this time it affirmed the findings
of the lower courts.
The Supreme Court held that §2.2-4002(B)(3)
did not control in this situation because another
section, § 62.1-44.29, expressly provides for the
judicial review of all final decisions of the Board
relating to the issuance of water protection per-
mits. “When one statute addresses a subject in a
general manner and another addresses a part of
the same subject in a more specific manner, the
two statutes should be harmonized, if possible,
and when they conflict, the more specific statute
prevails.”1 The Court found that the more specif-
ic provisions in §62.1-44.29 controlled and
Virginia was therefore not exempt.
Board’s Decision
The Supreme Court rejected all arguments that
the Board’s decision was not based on substantial
evidence. The court found that the Board consid-
ered the scientific studies that were available to
it and imposed permitting conditions to address
adverse impacts. For example, one permit condi-
tion requires the City to create twice as many
wetlands as it destroys. The court held that the
Board did not abuse its discretion when it deter-
mined that wetland losses could be mitigated,
only minor salinity changes would occur, and
that the project was needed to meet future water
demands. The Court also found that the Board
adequately considered the cultural value of the
Tribe’s archaeological sites and was justified in
determining that it could not protect both the
sites and instream flows. The Alliance’s appeal
was over. The Tribe, however, had one option left.
Treaty Claims
The Board had refused to consider the Tribe’s
treaty rights before issuing the permit. The Tribe
contended that the Board, as a state agency, has
the duty to uphold the state’s treaty obligations.
The Court of Appeals disagreed and the Supreme
Court affirmed. The Board derives its authority
from the Virginia Water Control Law. It is autho-
rized only to issue water protection permits, not
determine private rights of citizens. The Board,
therefore, did lack the authority to consider the
treaty claims.
The Tribe also appealed the lower court rul-
ings that the treaty claims are governed by state
Mid-Atlantic, from page 1
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law, not federal law. The Tribe argued that the
Treaty is governed by federal law because of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
which states “all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land.” The
Supreme Court rejected the Tribe’s arguments
ruling that the treaty could not be federal law
because it was entered into in 1677, over 100
years before the Constitution was adopted in
1789. The United States did not exist in 1677 and
therefore could not have entered into a treaty
with the Mattaponi Tribe. The Tribe made the
interesting argument that the Supremacy
Clause’s reference to “treaties made” refers to all
treaties adopted with Indian tribes before 1789.
The court stated that while the Constitution does
refer to treaties made before 1789, that language
is a specific reference to treaties entered into by
the U.S. under the Articles of Confederation. It
does not apply to treaties entered into by Indian
tribes with the British Crown. The treaty is gov-
erned by state law.
The court remanded the case to the Circuit
Court for further proceedings on the Tribe’s
treaty claims. The litigation will continue, but
against only one defendant - the City. The Court
held that Virginia and its agencies are immune
from suit on the treaty claims. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity “protects the Common-
wealth from interference with the performance
of its governmental duties and preserves the
Commonwealth’s ability to control its funds,
properties, and instrumentalities.”2 Immunity
must be expressly waived by the state. The court
found no state law that expressly waived immuni-
ty for treaty violations. The City, however, is not
protected by sovereign immunity and the Tribe’s
case against it can proceed.
Conclusion
Although the Alliance and the Tribe have exhaust-
ed their remedies regarding the Board’s permit,
this litigation is far from over. In 2001, the
Norfolk District of the Corps of Engineers reject-
ed the City’s application for a §404 permit for the
dredge and fill of wetlands. The permit applica-
tion was elevated to the North Atlantic Division
in Boston when the Governor of Virginia issued a
letter in opposition to the permitting decision
invoking a rarely used federal law. 33 C.F.R. §
325.8(b)(2) requires district engineers to refer
permit applications to the division engineer
“when the recommended decision is contrary to
the written position of the Governor of the state
in which the work will be performed.” After
reviewing the referred permit application, the
division engineer may authorize the issuance of
§404 permits. On November 16, 2005, the North
Atlantic Division issued the City a §404 permit
for King William Reservoir. The Southern
Environmental Law Center has already
announced that it will challenge the permit in
federal court.
The Corps is not the only agency that has
flip-flopped during the permitting process. In
2003, the Virginia Marine Resources Com-
mission voted to deny a permit for a water intake
on the Mattaponi River. That should have
spelled the end of the project, but in September
2004 the Commission reversed itself. This per-
mit could also be challenged by the Alliance and
the Tribe.
Endnotes
1.  Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia, 621
S.E.2d 78, 87 (Va. 2005). 
2.  Id. at 96.
Photograph of flooding on the Mattaponi River courtesy of the USGS.
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Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
The management of the Klamath River Basin
poses significant challenges to federal agencies.
Too many demands on a scare resource means
there is simply not enough water to go around.
The Ninth Circuit recently remanded the
National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS)
latest attempt to balance irrigation with the
water needs of the threatened Southern Oregon/
Northern California Coast (SONCC) coho
salmon. 
Background
The Klamath Project is a federal irrigation sys-
tem consisting of several dams and reservoirs
established in the early twentieth century. The
number of coho in the Klamath River is estimat-
ed to have decreased to under 6,000 from a popu-
lation of at least 50,000 in the 1940’s. The
SONCC coho were listed as a threatened species
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in
1997. The ESA requires federal agencies to pre-
pare biological assessments when threatened or
endangered species are present in an area where
a federal action is planned. When an action may
affect an anadromous fish species, the agency
preparing the biological assessment must consult
with NMFS, who must then prepare a biological
opinion (BiOp) to determine the impact of the
action on the listed species and its habitat.
The first BiOp for the Klamath Project was
prepared in 1999. Conflict resulted almost imme-
diately. A severe drought in 2001 resulted in the
Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau), the agency in
charge of the Project, reducing water deliveries
for irrigation in order to comply with the flow
requirements of the BiOp. The reduction of deliv-
eries caused significant agricultural losses. The
Bureau prepared a new biological assessment in
February 2002 which proposed maintaining a
flow regime that varied depending on whether it
was a “wet” or “dry” year. Any water available
beyond what was needed to maintain flows would
be made available for irrigation. The Bureau also
proposed creating a water bank to store 100,000
acre-feet of water to compensate for shortfalls.
After reviewing the Bureau’s assessment,
NMFS concluded that the Bureau’s plan would
jeopardize the coho and adversely modified its
critical habitat. The Bureau’s planning target
was the Klamath’s minimum flow over the past
ten years, a baseline NMFS thought might
reduce the overall average flow of the River.
When NMFS makes a jeopardy finding, the ESA
requires the agency to develop Reasonable and
Prudent Alternatives (RPA) to the proposed
action to avoid jeopardy and adverse modifica-
tion. In its 2002 BiOp, NMFS developed an RPA
to replace the Bureau’s plan.
RPA
NMFS’s RPA covers Klamath Project operations
between 2002 and 2012. The RPA assumes that
the Bureau should only be responsible for water
losses caused by the Project. Because the Project
irrigates 57 percent of the land in the Basin,
NMFS concluded that the Bureau would only be
required to provide 57 percent of the water need-
ed by the coho and that an intergovermental task
force should be convened to develop the other 43
percent. NMFS did not state from what sources
the other 43 percent would be “developed.” 
The RPA is divided into three phases.
Between 2002 - 2005 (Phase I), the Bureau is to
gradually develop the water bank, form the task
force, and conduct scientific studies. Between
2006-2010 (Phase II), the Bureau must increase
the water bank to 100,000 acre-feet and provide
either its 57 percent share or the flows proposed
in the Bureau’s biological assessment, whichever
is greater. Not until Phase III, 2010-2011, will 100
percent of the coho water needs be met when the
other sources start contributing their 43 percent
in addition to the Bureau’s 57 percent share.
Agencies Suffer Another Setback in
Management of Klamath River Basin
After 33,000 chinook, coho, and steelhead
salmon died in an unexplained fish kill in the
Klamath River in September 2002, the Pacific
Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations
(Pacific Coast) challenged the RPA. On July 14,
2003, the district court ruled that the short-term
measures, those in Phase I and II, were not arbi-
trary and capricious. The court found that
NMFS had adequately supported its finding that
providing less water for coho in the short-term
would not jeopardize the species over the long-
term. The court, however, did rule against NMFS
on a crucial aspect of the RPA. The court found
that NMFS’s requirement that the Bureau pro-
vide only 57 percent of the long-term flows was
arbitrary because there was not enough certainty
that 100 percent of the flows could be provided
through a collaborative process. Neither party
appealed this ruling. Pacific Coast did appeal the
district court’s ruling regarding Phase I and II.
Implicit Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district
court and held that NMFS’s RPA was arbitrary
and capricious because it contained inadequate
analysis of the effect of reduced water flows on
coho during the first eight years of implementa-
tion. The district court had determined that
NMFS’s conclusion that the reduced flows would
not jeopardize the species was implicit in the
agency’s phased approach. 
“It is a basic principle of administrative law
that the agency must articulate the reason or rea-
sons for its decision.”1 The Ninth Circuit held
that NMFS had failed to articulate its reasons
and that its analysis was too conclusory. The
court stated that, for example, NMFS failed to
adequately discuss how additions of water from
the water bank will affect water levels or water
temperatures in the main stem of the Klamath
River. Furthermore, with respect to the 57 per-
cent figure, the court found that NMFS failed to
explain how providing only slightly more than
half of the coho needs would avoid jeopardy. The
court reminded NMFS that “the proper baseline
analysis is not the proportional share of responsi-
bility the federal agency bears for the decline in
the species, but what jeopardy might result from
the agency’s proposed actions in the present and
future human and natural context.”2
NMFS completely failed to explain how jeop-
ardy would be avoided during Phase I and II
where lesser flows were anticipated while the task
force was “developing” the other 43 percent of
water flows the Bureau was supposedly not
responsible for. The court found this especially
troublesome because Phase I and II accounted for
eight years of the ten-year plan. With a three-year
life cycle, five generations of coho would com-
plete their life cycles during those eight years. If
water flows during Phase I and II are not suffi-
cient, five generations of coho will be lost and the
species will most certainly be jeopardized. 
The court acknowledged that NMFS’s discus-
sions relating to Phase III and the long-term flow
recommendations are much more detailed. The
court found that the agency clearly explained
how the long-term flow recommendations would
improve habitat and increase survival. The detail
in the Phase III section of the RPA only served to
highlight that analysis was missing with respect
to Phases I and II. The Ninth Circuit stated that
“the agency’s analysis of the beneficial effects of
the long-term flows, in combination with the
absence of analysis of the effects of substantially
lower short-term flows, leads us to conclude that
the reasoning behind the agency’s plan cannot be
reasonably discerned.”3
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit remanded the RPA to the dis-
trict court for issuance of appropriate injunctive
relief to avoid jeopardy until a new BiOp can be
prepared by the agency. In revising its BiOp,
NMFS must explain how the lesser flows antici-
pated during Phase I and II will provide enough
water to ensure the salmon will survive until the
Phase III recommendations can be implemented.
Endnotes
1.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1091
(9th Cir. 2005).
2.  Id. at 1093.
3.  Id. at 1092.
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Lienhart v. Caribbean Hospitality Servs., Inc., 426
F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
Lynda Lancaster, J.D.
In a recent liability case, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Aruba Grand Beach Resort &
Casino (Aruba Grand) has the responsibility to
warn guests about trucks and boat trailers cross-
ing the beach. 
Background
On May 9, 1998, while vacationing at the Aruba
Grand, Janice Lienhart was struck by a pickup
truck and boat trailer operated by Unique
Sports of Aruba (Unique Sports) while asleep on
the beach in front of the Aruba Grand. Lienhart
suffered extensive injuries to her face, chest,
neck, and arm which have required years of
medical treatment. At the time of the accident,
Lienhart was utilizing a lounge chair placed
under a tiki hut by a member of the Aruba
Grand’s staff. 
The Aruba Grand is a large resort operated
by Caribbean Hospitality Services, a Florida
management company. To draw guests to its
facility, the resort heavily promotes its private
beach, adjacent public beach, and water activi-
ties. Unique Sports offers snorkeling and scuba
diving trips which depart directly from the
resort. Unique Sports rents space from the
Aruba Grand and its facilities are adjacent to
the hotel.
Lienhart sued Unique Sports, the Aruba
Grand, and Caribbean Hospitality Services for
damages resulting from the accident. Lienhart
argued that the Aruba Grand was required to
inform guests about the trucks on the beach
because it knew of the dangerous conditions
created by Unique Sports’s activities. The
Aruba Grand argued that  they were not
responsible for  the injuries  to Lienhart
because Lienhart’s injuries were solely the
result of Unique Sports’s negligence. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of
Aruba Grand, concluding that the resort could
not be held responsible for the negligence of
another party.
“Zone of Danger”
The Eleventh Circuit focused on whether the
Aruba Grand created a “zone of danger” by
directing its guests to an area of the beach fre-
quented by vehicles. Florida law, as a matter of
public policy, requires landowners to maintain
their property in a reasonably safe condition
and imposes a duty to warn of concealed perils
that are known or should be known to the
landowner, but which are unknown or undiscov-
erable to guests.1
Unlike the trial court, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the Aruba Grand did have a
duty  to  Lienhart .  The court  found that
Lienhart’s injuries resulted from a “risk the
Aruba Grand created and failed to warn or
guard against.”2 The Aruba Grand controlled
the area of the beach where Lienhart was sitting
and knew that one of its tenants, Unique Sports,
transported equipment in the area. The Aruba
Grand was also aware that Unique Sports drove
across the public beach without any demarca-
tion of a driving path and without back-up
devices on the trucks. The Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that the Aruba Grand had created a dan-
gerous situation by allowing Unique Sports to
Aruba Resort Has Duty to Warn
Photograph courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
trailer boats to and from the beach without sep-
arating the lounge chairs and tiki huts from the
traffic on the beach. The Aruba Grand, there-
fore, breached its duty to minimize the risk of
harm to its guests. 
Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court erred by granting summary judgment
and remanded the case to determine whether
Caribbean Hospitality manages the Aruba
Grand to such an extent that it assumes con-
tractual liability. This issue was never reached
on remand as the parties settled prior to the
second trial.
Endnotes 
1.  Lienhart v. Caribbean Hospitality Servs., 426
F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005).
2.  Id. at 1340.
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Elizabeth Taylor, 2005 Knauss Sea Grant Fellow;
J.D. Lewis & Clark Law School
It’s hard to believe that my year as a Knauss fel-
low at the Marine Mammal Commission is
almost up. The fellowship has given me the
opportunity to be involved in numerous fascinat-
ing marine resource conservation issues. Most
recently, I’ve taken the lead on drafting the
Commission’s comments on the southern sea
otter translocation program. This issue reflects
the complexities involved with ecosystem man-
agement given competing resource use demands
and the current state of marine habitat.
Southern sea otters once ranged along the
California coast and into Baja California.
However, the fur trade brought southern sea
otters to the brink of extinction, with only a small
remnant colony surviving in central California.
In 1977, the southern sea otter was listed as
threatened under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). As a keystone species, sea otters have a
substantial impact on their prey species, includ-
ing crabs, lobsters, sea urchins and abalone. The
near-extinction of the sea otters along the
California coast altered the coastal ecosystem,
allowing invertebrate populations to increase and
shellfish fisheries to prosper. In 1987, the Marine
Mammal Commission was integral in designing a
zonal management plan as a compromise between
sea otter recovery goals and shellfish fisheries.
Under the plan, a “no-otter zone” was designated
so that any otter found south of Point Conception
would be removed to minimize conflicts between
shellfish fisheries and sea otters. However, recent
information on the population status, behavior
and ecology of sea otters has revealed the adverse
effects of containment that were not previously
considered. A final biological opinion was issued
in 2000, concluding that continuation of the con-
tainment program would likely jeopardize the
continued existence of the species. 
Currently, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service is
proposing to discontinue the zonal management
program and allow sea otters to expand their
range south of Point Conception. The proposed
action, however, presents a serious dilemma for
resource managers trying to manage sea otters (a
threatened species nearly extirpated by human
hunting) and at least two abalone species that
have declined significantly in recent years. These
abalone species are prey of sea otters and were
also valuable fishery resources. The proposed
action would benefit otters, but would further
exacerbate the decline of white abalone (listed as
endangered under the ESA) and black abalone (a
candidate for listing). This situation illustrates
the need for comprehensive ecosystem manage-
ment and the importance of considering future
consequences of current actions.
Reflections of a Knauss
Fellow: Part 4
109 Public Law 58 - Energy Policy Act of 2005 (H.R. 6)
Contains numerous provisions affecting renewable energy development and oil and gas production.
Grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the exclusive authority to approve or deny an
application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG terminal. Authorizes the
Secretary of Interior (through the Mineral Management Service) to grant a lease, easement, or right
of way on the Outer Continental Shelf for the production, transportation, or transmission of “energy
from sources other than oil and gas.” Prohibits the issuance of federal or state permits and leases for
“new oil and gas slant, directional, or offshore drilling in or under one or more of the Great Lakes.”
109 Public Law 74 - Sportfishing and Recreational Boating Safety Amendments Act of 2005 (H.R. 3649)
Ensures funding for sportfishing and boating safety programs funded out of the Highway Trust Fund
through the end of fiscal year 2005.
109 Public Law 106 - NFIP Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 2005 (H.R. 4133)
Amends the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to increase from $3.5 billion to $18.5 billion,
through FY2008, the total amount which the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency may borrow from the Secretary of the Treasury with the President’s approval to carry out the
flood insurance program.
109 Public Law 117 - An Act to Amend Public Law 89-366 (H.R. 126)
Allows for an adjustment in the number of free roaming horses permitted in Cape Lookout National
Seashore from 100 to not less than 110, with a target population of between 120 and 130.
109 Public Law 121 - Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 (H.R. 1973)
Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the President to furnish assistance for pro-
grams in developing countries to provide affordable and equitable access to safe water and sanita-
tion. Directs the President to develop a strategy to be implemented by U.S. AID to further U.S. for-
eign assistance in this area. Directs the Secretary of State to report to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate on U.S. efforts to promote programs that develop river basin, aquifer, and other water-
shed-wide mechanisms for governance and cooperation.
109 Public Law 135 - Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (H.R. 4440)
Amends the Internal Revenue Code to establish a program of tax benefits for businesses and indi-
viduals in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area, to be known as the Gulf Opportunity Zone or GO
Zone. Authorizes the issuance of Gulf Opportunity Zone bonds as tax-exempt facility bonds by the
states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi and requires that 95 percent of the net proceeds of
such bonds be used for the cost of acquisition, construction, reconstruction, and renovation of non-
residential real and residential rental property and public utility property in the GO Zone. Extends
tax benefits currently available to businesses and individuals in Hurricane Katrina disaster areas to
victims of Hurricane Rita and Wilma.
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2005 Federal Legislative Update
The following is a summary of federal legislation related to coastal, fisheries, water, and nat-
ural resources enacted during 2005 by the 109th Congress.
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Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes and UNEP Regional Seas Program Partner (March 2005)
The United Nations Environmental Program’s Regional Seas Program and the Secretariat of the
Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to address
coastal pollution. The agreement allows the two organizations to support each other with technical
and legal training and cooperate on the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes
in order to prevent coastal and marine pollution.
FAO Adopts Voluntary Eco-labeling Guidelines for Marine Fisheries (April 2005)
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Committee on Fisheries adopted guidelines
for eco-labeling of fish caught at sea in an attempt to ensure the sustainability of marine fisheries.
The new guidelines provide guidance to governments and organizations that maintain, or are con-
sidering establishing, labeling schemes for fish and fishery products from well-managed marine
capture fisheries.  The guidelines are available at  ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008-
/a0116t/a0116t00.pdf .
FAO Establishes New Regional Fisheries Body (May 2005)
The FAO established a new regional fisheries body to promote responsible and sustainable fishing
in the southwestern Indian Ocean. The South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission is made
up of fourteen coastal states and will function as an advisory body to promote the sustainable
development and utilization of coastal fishery resources off the shores of East Africa and several
island states of the region. 
Water and Health Protocol Enters into Force (August 2005)
The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes entered into force on August 4, 2005 follow-
ing the ratification by France in May 2005. The Protocol aims to promote the protection of human
health and well-being through improvement of water management, including the protection of
water ecosystems, and prevention, control, and reduction of water-related disease. The text of the
Protocol is available at http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2000/wat/mp.wat.2000.1.e.pdf .
New Regulations For Mediterranean Fishing Enter into Force (September 2005)
New fishing regulations banning towed trawl nets and dredges at depths greater than 1,000 meters
entered into force in the Mediterranean. The measures were agreed upon by the twenty-four mem-
bers of the FAO’s General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and must now be enforced
at the national level. Mediterranean countries will also require trawlers to use a minimum mesh-size
opening of 40 mm in the “cod end” section of the nets which should allow more juvenile fish to
escape and reduce bycatch.
International Law Update
Below is a summary of the coastal- and marine-related international law develop-
ments in 2005.
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In Salmon Wars: The Battle for the West Coast
Salmon Fishery, Dennis Brown provides a eulogy
for the Canadian salmon fishery as he knew it. In
the 1990's, just as the cod stocks were collapsing
on the East Coast of Canada, Canadian salmon
fishermen were battling for their right to harvest
Pacific salmon. The fishermen were fighting a los-
ing battle against the Canadian Department of
Fisheries and Oceans, the canning industry, con-
servationists, and, most appallingly, Americans.
The individual fishermen did not stand a chance.
Fleet reduction in the ‘70s and ‘80s pushed many
owner-operator fishermen out of the industry and
conservation concerns in the ‘90s almost shut the
fishery down entirely.
Salmon Wars is not
an account of industry
greed and declining fish
stocks. Millions of Paci-
fic salmon were return-
ing to Canadian rivers in
the late ‘90s. This is a tale
of politics -  domestic,
international, corporate.
The salmon were the unfor-
tunate pawns in a game of
chess being played by politicians, corporate exec-
utives, native leaders, and fishermen. Brown
served on the front lines during the Pacific salmon
crisis, first as a union organizer for the United
Fishermen and Allied Workers Union and later as
fishery policy advisor to the Premier of British
Columbia. Through Brown's eyes, the reader sees
how the Canadian salmon fishermen are pushed
to the edge by government inaction, indifference,
and compromise. It's an important case study of
one of the most contentious fish wars in the histo-
ry of Canada-U.S. relations.
Book Review . . . 
Stephanie Showalter
Marine and coastal issues will occupy a significant part of the agenda for the 12th annual University
of Florida College of Law Public Interest Environmental Law Conference from March 8th - 11th of
this year. The overall theme of this year's conference is "In Fairness to Future Generations," drawing
on the environmental policy principle of Intergenerational Equity. This year's conference also serves
as the annual conference of the National Association of Environmental Law Societies (NAELS). The
Keynote banquet speaker will be Sylvia Earle, National Geographic Underwater Explorer and for-
mer NOAA Chief Scientist. 
The marine and coastal track begins with a plenary address by Tulane Law Professor Oliver
Houck, who will put Hurricane Katrina in its downstream context. Panels will address conservation
leasing of submerged lands led by Kristen Fletcher of Rhode Island Sea Grant; marine ecosystem
management led by David White of the Ocean Conservancy; Fortress Florida?: The Future of
Florida Coastal Policy led by Gary Appelson of the Caribbean Conservation Corporation, and
Getting There From Here: Marine and Coastal Access Issues, led by Scott Shine of the Surfrider
Foundation.
Other Keynote Speakers include a kickoff address by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., author of the book
Crimes Against Nature, Richard Louv, author of Last Child in the Woods and Carole Browner, former
EPA administrator. For more information including the full agenda, registration and contacts visit
http://www.ufpiec.org or http://www.naels.org . 
Public Interest Environmental Law Conference to
Highlight Marine and Coastal Issues
Salmon Wars
The Battle for the West Coast Salmon Fishery
Dennis Brown (Harbour Publishing, 2005).
The Minerals Management Service (MMS) issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPR) on December 30, 2005 seeking comments on alternate energy-related uses of the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the Department of Interior, via
the MMS, to grant leases, easements, and other rights-of-way on the OCS for the development and
support of energy resources from sources other than oil and gas, such as wind, wave, solar, and cur-
rent, and to allow for alternative uses of existing facilities, which could include offshore aquaculture
and recreation. In its announcement, MMS was clear that it “is not seeking the authority over activi-
ties such as aquaculture, but only the decision to allow platforms to be converted to such uses, if the
appropriate agency approves the underlying activity.” The ANPR, published at 70 Federal Register
77,345, contains a lengthy list of general issues the MMS is seeking information on in five major pro-
gram areas: access to OCS lands and resources; environmental information, management, and com-
pliance, operational activities; payments and revenues; and coordination and consultation. The
MMS is accepting comments until February 28, 2006.
Five years after Atlantic salmon were declared endangered, federal regulators have released their
recovery plan for the species. In 2000, the year the salmon were listed, about 300 mature salmon
returned to eight rivers in Maine. By 2004, between 60 and 113 fish returned. The focus of the recov-
ery plan is to stop the decline and ultimately restore salmon runs from the Kennebec River to the
Canadian border. The recovery plan contains nine key recovery actions, including conserving land to
protect river watersheds and improving aquaculture practices. The recovery plan would cost $35 mil-
lion over three years to implement in full. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently limited the pumping operations of Ice
Mountain Spring Water, a bottling plant about 50 miles north of Grand Rapids.
Although Ice Mountain currently pumps about 250 gallons per minute, the com-
pany has state permits authorizing it to pump as much as 400 gallons per minute
from a nearby spring. The court held that Ice Mountain is entitled to make “rea-
sonable use” of the area’s available water resources, but that a 400-gallon-a-minute
withdrawal rate would unreasonably interfere with rights of adjacent landowners. 
Around the Globe
In November, conservation groups and landholders in the U.S. and Mexico
reached agreement on a plan to protect 110,000 acres surrounding a Mexican lagoon used by gray
whales as a calving ground. Gray whales migrate from the Bering Sea to Laguna San Ignacio, about
450 miles south of San Diego, to mate and bear their young. San Ignacio is part of the Vizcaino
Biosphere Reserve, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The communal landholders in Mexico agreed to
limit development around the lagoon in exchange for $25,000 a year from a trust fund established by
the San Diego-based International Community Foundation. A Mexican conservation group,
Pronature, will manage the funds which will be used to fund environmentally friendly projects in the
area and provide loans to landholders wanting to undertake ecotourism activities such as whale
watching tours.
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